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authorRyan Barnett <rjbarnet@rockwellcollins.com>2013-08-29 22:41:08 (GMT)
committer Peter Korsgaard <jacmet@sunsite.dk>2013-09-02 19:42:41 (GMT)
commit9093cc451c702c3b16fb704f524398abda85c2d2 (patch)
tree023869bc384faab4081314d464ed195bf94210f2
parentd1de1c0d1f207a695f4998f6873b7131ece25a65 (diff)
downloadbuildroot-9093cc451c702c3b16fb704f524398abda85c2d2.tar.gz
buildroot-9093cc451c702c3b16fb704f524398abda85c2d2.tar.bz2
libcurl: up revision to 7.32.0
Updating revision of libcurl to version 7.32.0 Signed-off-by: Ryan Barnett <rjbarnet@rockwellcollins.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <jacmet@sunsite.dk>
-rw-r--r--package/libcurl/libcurl-01-CVE-2013-0249.patch65
-rw-r--r--package/libcurl/libcurl-02-CVE-2013-1944.patch57
-rw-r--r--package/libcurl/libcurl-03-CVE-2013-2174.patch38
-rw-r--r--package/libcurl/libcurl.mk4
4 files changed, 2 insertions, 162 deletions
diff --git a/package/libcurl/libcurl-01-CVE-2013-0249.patch b/package/libcurl/libcurl-01-CVE-2013-0249.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7d2af2a..0000000
--- a/package/libcurl/libcurl-01-CVE-2013-0249.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-From ee45a34907ffeb5fd95b0513040d8491d565b663 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Eldar Zaitov <kyprizel@volema.com>
-Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2013 23:22:27 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message: fix buffer overflow
-
-When negotiating SASL DIGEST-MD5 authentication, the function
-Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message() uses the data provided from the
-server without doing the proper length checks and that data is then
-appended to a local fixed-size buffer on the stack.
-
-This vulnerability can be exploited by someone who is in control of a
-server that a libcurl based program is accessing with POP3, SMTP or
-IMAP. For applications that accept user provided URLs, it is also
-thinkable that a malicious user would feed an application with a URL to
-a server hosting code targetting this flaw.
-
-Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130206.html
----
- lib/curl_sasl.c | 23 ++++++-----------------
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/curl_sasl.c b/lib/curl_sasl.c
-index 57116b6..d07387d 100644
---- a/lib/curl_sasl.c
-+++ b/lib/curl_sasl.c
-@@ -346,9 +346,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message(struct SessionHandle *data,
- snprintf(&HA1_hex[2 * i], 3, "%02x", digest[i]);
-
- /* Prepare the URL string */
-- strcpy(uri, service);
-- strcat(uri, "/");
-- strcat(uri, realm);
-+ snprintf(uri, sizeof(uri), "%s/%s", service, realm);
-
- /* Calculate H(A2) */
- ctxt = Curl_MD5_init(Curl_DIGEST_MD5);
-@@ -392,20 +390,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message(struct SessionHandle *data,
- for(i = 0; i < MD5_DIGEST_LEN; i++)
- snprintf(&resp_hash_hex[2 * i], 3, "%02x", digest[i]);
-
-- strcpy(response, "username=\"");
-- strcat(response, userp);
-- strcat(response, "\",realm=\"");
-- strcat(response, realm);
-- strcat(response, "\",nonce=\"");
-- strcat(response, nonce);
-- strcat(response, "\",cnonce=\"");
-- strcat(response, cnonce);
-- strcat(response, "\",nc=");
-- strcat(response, nonceCount);
-- strcat(response, ",digest-uri=\"");
-- strcat(response, uri);
-- strcat(response, "\",response=");
-- strcat(response, resp_hash_hex);
-+ snprintf(response, sizeof(response),
-+ "username=\"%s\",realm=\"%s\",nonce=\"%s\","
-+ "cnonce=\"%s\",nc=\"%s\",digest-uri=\"%s\",response=%s",
-+ userp, realm, nonce,
-+ cnonce, nonceCount, uri, resp_hash_hex);
-
- /* Base64 encode the reply */
- return Curl_base64_encode(data, response, 0, outptr, outlen);
---
-1.7.10.4
-
diff --git a/package/libcurl/libcurl-02-CVE-2013-1944.patch b/package/libcurl/libcurl-02-CVE-2013-1944.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 18d9c2d..0000000
--- a/package/libcurl/libcurl-02-CVE-2013-1944.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-From 3604fde3d3c9b0d0e389e079aecf470d123ba180 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: YAMADA Yasuharu <yasuharu.yamada@access-company.com>
-Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2013 00:17:15 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] cookie: fix tailmatching to prevent cross-domain leakage
-
-Cookies set for 'example.com' could accidentaly also be sent by libcurl
-to the 'bexample.com' (ie with a prefix to the first domain name).
-
-This is a security vulnerabilty, CVE-2013-1944.
-
-Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130412.html
----
- lib/cookie.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c
-index 4b9ec0b..a67204e 100644
---- a/lib/cookie.c
-+++ b/lib/cookie.c
-@@ -118,15 +118,29 @@ static void freecookie(struct Cookie *co)
- free(co);
- }
-
--static bool tailmatch(const char *little, const char *bigone)
-+static bool tailmatch(const char *cooke_domain, const char *hostname)
- {
-- size_t littlelen = strlen(little);
-- size_t biglen = strlen(bigone);
-+ size_t cookie_domain_len = strlen(cooke_domain);
-+ size_t hostname_len = strlen(hostname);
-
-- if(littlelen > biglen)
-+ if(hostname_len < cookie_domain_len)
- return FALSE;
-
-- return Curl_raw_equal(little, bigone+biglen-littlelen) ? TRUE : FALSE;
-+ if(!Curl_raw_equal(cooke_domain, hostname+hostname_len-cookie_domain_len))
-+ return FALSE;
-+
-+ /* A lead char of cookie_domain is not '.'.
-+ RFC6265 4.1.2.3. The Domain Attribute says:
-+ For example, if the value of the Domain attribute is
-+ "example.com", the user agent will include the cookie in the Cookie
-+ header when making HTTP requests to example.com, www.example.com, and
-+ www.corp.example.com.
-+ */
-+ if(hostname_len == cookie_domain_len)
-+ return TRUE;
-+ if('.' == *(hostname + hostname_len - cookie_domain_len - 1))
-+ return TRUE;
-+ return FALSE;
- }
-
- /*
---
-1.7.10.4
-
diff --git a/package/libcurl/libcurl-03-CVE-2013-2174.patch b/package/libcurl/libcurl-03-CVE-2013-2174.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 673431f..0000000
--- a/package/libcurl/libcurl-03-CVE-2013-2174.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From 6032f0ff672f09babf69d9d42bcde6eb9eeb5bea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
-Date: Sun, 19 May 2013 23:24:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Curl_urldecode: no peeking beyond end of input buffer
-
-Security problem: CVE-2013-2174
-
-If a program would give a string like "%" to curl_easy_unescape(), it
-would still consider the % as start of an encoded character. The
-function then not only read beyond the buffer but it would also deduct
-the *unsigned* counter variable for how many more bytes there's left to
-read in the buffer by two, making the counter wrap. Continuing this, the
-function would go on reading beyond the buffer and soon writing beyond
-the allocated target buffer...
-
-Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130622.html
-Reported-by: Timo Sirainen
----
- lib/escape.c | 5 +++--
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/escape.c b/lib/escape.c
-index 6a26cf8..aa7db2c 100644
---- a/lib/escape.c
-+++ b/lib/escape.c
-@@ -159,7 +159,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_urldecode(struct SessionHandle *data,
-
- while(--alloc > 0) {
- in = *string;
-- if(('%' == in) && ISXDIGIT(string[1]) && ISXDIGIT(string[2])) {
-+ if(('%' == in) && (alloc > 2) &&
-+ ISXDIGIT(string[1]) && ISXDIGIT(string[2])) {
- /* this is two hexadecimal digits following a '%' */
- char hexstr[3];
- char *ptr;
---
-1.7.10.4
-
diff --git a/package/libcurl/libcurl.mk b/package/libcurl/libcurl.mk
index 56f13ba..d5012b6 100644
--- a/package/libcurl/libcurl.mk
+++ b/package/libcurl/libcurl.mk
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
#
################################################################################
-LIBCURL_VERSION = 7.28.1
+LIBCURL_VERSION = 7.32.0
LIBCURL_SOURCE = curl-$(LIBCURL_VERSION).tar.bz2
LIBCURL_SITE = http://curl.haxx.se/download
LIBCURL_LICENSE = ICS
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ LIBCURL_CONF_ENV += ac_cv_lib_crypto_CRYPTO_lock=yes
# Fix it by setting LD_LIBRARY_PATH to something sensible so those libs
# are found first.
LIBCURL_CONF_ENV += LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$$LD_LIBRARY_PATH:/lib:/usr/lib
-LIBCURL_CONF_OPT += --with-ssl=$(STAGING_DIR)/usr \
+LIBCURL_CONF_OPT += --with-ssl \
--with-random=/dev/urandom \
--with-ca-path=/etc/ssl/certs
else